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PRIVACY AT 50: THE BEDROOM, THE COURTROOM, AND THE
SPACES IN BETWEEN
JUDITH A. BAER ∗
Fifty years have passed since the Supreme Court found a right of privacy in the Constitution. Whether Griswold v. Connecticut 1 recognized or
invented this right is a question that resists resolution. Griswold was a ruling whose doctrine had more impact than its immediate result. The Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives was “uncommonly silly,”
“obviously unenforceable,” and unique.2 The only law in the United States
anywhere near as restrictive was Massachusetts’s prohibition of the sale and
distribution. Birth control was not a controversial issue—the Pill had been
available for five years—which may be one reason why the ruling got little
critical scrutiny. Within ten years, the right itself grew from a marital right
to an individual right (there went the Massachusetts law) to a right to abortion. 3 The first ruling raised few, if any, eyebrows. The second provoked a
firestorm that has raged ever since. The judicial response to this controversy has veered between retreat and advance.
Bowers v. Hardwick 4 found no privacy issue in a law criminalizing
homosexual activity. Instead, the majority refused to recognize what it
called “a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.” 5 Lawrence
v. Texas 6 proclaimed Bowers “not correct when it was decided, [and] not
correct today.” 7 No such reversal has occurred in the Justices’ approaches
to abortion rights. The trend has been consistently negative, as successive
Republican presidents have selected anti-choice Justices. The Court did not
reverse Roe v. Wade, 8 as predicted, but Planned Parenthood v. Casey 9 demoted abortion from a right to a semi-right. Since 1992, restrictions on

© 2015 Judith A. Baer.
∗
Texas A&M University.
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. Id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
3. The Massachusetts case was Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The abortion case
was Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
5. Id. at 191.
6. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
7. Id. at 578; see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (invalidating the
Defense of Marriage Act). Here, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion stressed both individual rights and state powers.
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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abortion do not need compelling justification; they need only avoid imposing an “undue burden.” 10 Rulings since Casey have endorsed governmental
powers to restrict access to abortion. 11
In June 2015, Obergefell v. Hodges 12 ruled that same-sex marriage is
legal and all existing same-sex marriages are valid throughout the United
States. “[T]he right to marry,” Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for the majority, “is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and
that liberty.” 13
This ruling, while less polarizing than Roe, is controversial both outside and within the Court; all four dissenters wrote opinions. Depending on
the future composition of the Court, Obergefell may either reinforce the
right of privacy or invite rulings that do to Griswold what West Coast Hotel
v. Parrish 14 did to Lochner v. New York. 15
I differ from most political scientists, and many legal scholars, in asserting that both Griswold and Roe were rightly decided. The flaws in the
reasoning of both cases, which have been pointed out at too much length by
too many authors to require repetition, do not vitiate the argument for inferring a constitutional right of privacy. (And why is it that students of constitutional law speak of inferred rights but implied powers?) As far as I am
concerned, the legitimacy of the right to privacy is no longer an issue. This
Paper has two purposes. First, I inquire what is distinctive and defensible
about the privacy right established in Griswold, extended in Roe, and affirmed in Lawrence. Second, I explore the implications of this freedom for
another core constitutional value: equality.
I. PRIVACY, AUTONOMY, AND ASSOCIATION
The easiest criticism to make about Griswold and Roe is that they are
just as bad as Lochner: they limit legislative power by entrenching a right
not specified in the Constitution.16 The easiest refutation of that criticism
points out the differences between those who benefitted from Lochner and
those who benefitted from Griswold. In 1905, the real victors were em-

10. Id. at 874; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
11. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). Restrictions that have been sustained include waiting periods, reporting requirements, mandatory counseling, and limitations on
where and by whom abortions may be performed.
12. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
13. Id. at 2604.
14. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
15. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
16. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
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ployers who could set employees’ working hours without government interference. In 1965, the victors were women who could not afford private
medical care; they got freedom that everyone else in Connecticut already
had. 17 But the similarities between the decisions are greater than twentyfirst-century liberals might like to admit. In neither case does the majority
opinion pertain to the actual controversy. Justice Rufus Peckham waxed
eloquent about the right of “grown and intelligent men” to “labor to earn
their living,” but Lochner protected the power of an employer to set working hours. 18 Justice William O. Douglas’s rhetorical question—“Would we
permit the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?”—accompanied a ruling that upheld
the right of the Planned Parenthood Association to establish a clinic and
dispense contraceptives. 19
Analysis of the Griswold opinion reveals yet another similarity with
Lochner. Douglas cited several constitutional provisions to support his
conclusion that a “penumbra” surrounding the Bill of Rights established a
right of privacy. 20 These included “[t]he right of association contained in
the penumbra of the First Amendment,” the Third Amendment’s prohibition of quartering soldiers in homes in peacetime, the Search and Seizures
Clause of the Fourth Amendment, the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment’s reference to unenumerated
rights. 21 The use of the Ninth Amendment by Justice Douglas and Justice
Arthur Goldberg was exciting, but it went nowhere. The two dissenters,
Justice Hugo Black and Justice Potter Stewart, insisted that its purpose was
to reserve power to the people within the states.22 They continued the tradition established in Barron v. Baltimore 23 of reading rights phrased in the
passive voice as limiting only the federal government. Justice Goldberg did
not stay on the Court long enough to continue making the argument. 24 Justice Douglas’s opinion does little more than list the remaining rights. Aside
from his concept of “penumbra,” he does not attempt to integrate them into
a whole, to ask, “What may these rights, read together, mean?”

17. Mark A. Graber makes a similar argument about Roe: that legalization made abortion
available for women who could not previously afford it. But even for the affluent, getting an illegal abortion was difficult and expensive. MARK A GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION: EQUAL
CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS (1996).
18. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61.
19. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
20. Id. at 484.
21. Id.
22. Respectively, id. at 518–20 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 529–30 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
23. 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
24. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487–91 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Goldberg resigned from the
Court in the summer of 1965 to become ambassador to the United Nations.
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The differences among the rights are as obvious as the similarities.
The Third and Fourth Amendment provisions are rights to seclusion: the
immunity from self-incrimination, a right to secrecy. The privacy rights
differ in kind from both of these. Griswold protected a right of association
(within marriage). Roe, Casey, and Lawrence endorsed rights to autonomy.
Griswold was not the first occasion that the Court had protected such a
right. The decision’s doctrinal ancestors, cited therein, were NAACP v. Alabama, 25 which invalidated on First Amendment grounds a requirement
that organizations turn their membership lists over to the state on request,
and two decisions 26 from the 1920s written by, of all people, Justice James
McReynolds. 27
Calling NAACP v. Alabama a privacy case is more confusing than enlightening; the right involved was a right of public association. Meyer v.
Nebraska struck down restrictions on the teaching in, and of, foreign languages in public schools. 28 Pierce v. Society of Sisters negated an initiative
making public school attendance compulsory, on the grounds that it violated the “liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”29 (The concrete result of this decision
was, in fact, to protect the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary
from state interference with their school system). The Court decided these
cases on substantive due process grounds. Lochner lived.
Why, then, do I defend constitutional privacy rights? Despite Griswold’s failure, they can be based on a holistic and integrated interpretation
of the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clauses, or both—even without the
Ninth Amendment. 30 The distance between listing “zones of privacy” and
identifying a “zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees” is a logical step, not a leap, a vault, or, in John Hart Ely’s metaphor, a slalom. 31 Seclusion, secrecy, and association combine to endorse
private autonomy. This combination could not cover Roe, since abortion, at
that time, did not take place in private. But strong arguments have since

25. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
26. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
27. James Clark McReynolds, appointed by Woodrow Wilson, served from 1914 to 1941.
He consistently voted for business interests and against progressive legislation. Along with Willis
Van Devanter, George Sutherland, and Pierce Butler, he was one of the “Four Horseman” whose
hostility to New Deal programs provoked Franklin Roosevelt’s plan to increase the size of the
Court.
28. 262 U.S. at 400.
29. 268 U.S. at 534–35.
30. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1969).
31. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 66 (1980).
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been made for locating this privacy right in the Thirteenth32 or Fourteenth 33
Amendment. None of these arguments will satisfy those who agree with
Robert Bork that constitutional rights must be construed narrowly, 34 but the
judicial tradition of construing powers broadly militates against defending
that position.
Roe v. Wade exposed the defects of Griswold. The majority opinion
and separate concurrences suggest that at least some Justices found the step
from birth control to abortion easy. 35 The fact that seven male jurists assumed without argument in 1973 that the right of men and women to make
decisions about conception entailed the right of women to make decisions
about pregnancy was encouraging, but a nuanced, comprehensive discussion of why the similarities between birth control and abortion were more
important than the differences would have made the ruling less vulnerable.
Instead, the core of Justice Harry Blackmun’s majority opinion consisted of
a list, a proclamation, and a non sequitur. Justice Blackmun added some
post-1965 rulings, notably Eisenstadt v. Baird and Loving v. Virginia, to
Justice Douglas’s provisions and precedents. 36 “This right of privacy,” Justice Blackmun continued, “is broad enough to include a woman’s decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” 37 Why? Because unwanted
pregnancy harms pregnant women and their families. Generations of undergraduates in my courses in civil liberties and women and the law have
easily grasped the difficulty with the argument: law can force people to do
or not to do many things that can cause harm. Few legal scholars defended
Roe. 38 Courts retreated, handling privacy cases timidly.
Would it have made any difference if the privacy cases had been better
reasoned? Certainly not to the anti-choice lobby, or to the editors, authors,
and subsidizers responsible for the conservative, religious journal, First
Things. I doubt that Justice Byron White, whose dissent accused the majority of favoring “the convenience, whim, or caprice of the putative mother”

32. See Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor, Revisited: The Thirteenth Amendment and Abortion, in PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT ABOLITIONISM AND ITS
CONTEMPORARY VITALITY 226–44 (Alexander Tsesis ed., 2010).
33. Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Equality Arguments for Abortion Rights, 60 UCLA L.
REV. DISCOURSE 160 (2013).
34. Robert Bork, Tradition and Morality in Constitutional Law, 1984 Francis Boyer Lecture
at AEI Annual Dinner (Dec. 6, 1984), https://www.aei.org/publication/tradition-and-morality-inconstitutional-law/.
35. JUDITH A. BAER, OUR LIVES BEFORE THE LAW: CONSTRUCTING A FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE 125–28 (1999).
36. Respectively, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
37. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
38. For an exception, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES
(1990); Laurence H. Tribe, Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and
Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973).
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over “the life or potential life of the fetus,” would have been impressed.39
The former dean of the law school of Notre Dame wrote, “Mr. Justice
Blackmun seems unconscious of the fact that women want children.” 40 A
critic who misread so badly—the majority opinion referred consistently to
unwanted pregnancy—may have based his opposition to the ruling on his
opposition to the result. Some critics of Roe should have known better.
But there were judges like Justice William Rehnquist, whose dissent in
Roe emphasized not (preferred) result but (due) process.41 And scholars
like Ely, professor of law at Yale and Harvard and later law school dean at
Stanford, who labeled Roe “a very bad decision . . . because it is bad constitutional law, or rather because it is not constitutional law and gives no sense
of an obligation to try to be.” 42 Judges read legal scholarship; professors
teach future judges; and they all meet at conferences. Suppose solid arguments for privacy rights had influenced the bench, bar, and academy in the
generation since Roe. Would the pool of anti-choice candidates now available for judgeships exist? Would those members of the attentive public
who oppose legalized abortion but who consider other issues more important have put abortion on the back burner?
A popular argument against Roe (though inapplicable to Griswold or
Eisenstadt) asserts that it usurped a decision that belonged to the democratic
process. My students never make this argument without my teasing it out
of them, but legal experts and political scientists often do. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg has taken this position repeatedly. “My criticism of Roe,” she
said in 2013, “is that it seems to have stopped momentum on the side of
change.” 43 She would have preferred “that abortion rights be secured more
gradually, in a process that included state legislatures.” 44 Lawrence Tribe
has argued that few if any states were poised to follow New York’s and
Hawaii’s lead in legalizing abortion before Roe; no momentum existed. 45
Moreover, the “democratic process” is an abstraction; weighed against the
concrete reality of reluctant pregnancy, it must yield. I agree with Tribe
that Roe effectively assigned the abortion decision to pregnant women
themselves. This action fits easily within David Easton’s definition of politics as the authoritative allocation of values for society as a whole. We

39. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
40. Joseph O’Meara, Abortion: The Court Decides a Non-Case, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 343
(1974).
41. Roe, 410 U.S. at 172–78 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
42. Ely, supra note 16, at 947.
43. Meredith Heagney, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg Offers Critique of Roe v. Wade During
a Law School Visit, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS (May
15, 2013), www.law.uchicago.edu/news/justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-offer-critique-roe-v-wadeduring-law-school-visit.
44. Id.
45. Tribe, supra note 38, at 45–51.
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know that courts make political decisions, even if they avoid political questions. Roe v. Wade may have been bad politics. In the long run, it may do
more harm to abortion rights than good. But it is not wrong.
II. PRIVACY AND EQUALITY: CONFLICT? COOPERATION? BOTH?
The relationship and apparent contradiction between privacy and
equality has been exhaustively treated in constitutional jurisprudence.
Much of this discourse, to which I have contributed, involves questions of
gender. 46 The connection between public and private is equally present and
powerful in the relationship between privacy and gender equality. Justice
Ginsburg, who successfully argued several significant women’s rights cases
before the Court, is “troubled that the focus on Roe was on a right to privacy, rather than women’s rights.” 47 But in 1973, a decision based on the
Equal Protection Clause would have been a dramatic departure from precedent. Feminism was alive and well in the 1970s, but feminist equal protection doctrine was in its early stages.
The Court decided Roe a year and a month after it rejected the old rule
that sex was a valid basis for classification, in a case where then futureJustice Ginsburg co-authored the brief. 48 She wrote the American Civil
Liberties Union’s amicus brief in Frontiero v. Richardson, 49 decided a few
months after Roe, in which the Court came within one vote of declaring sex
a suspect classification, like race. But three years later, the Court, apparently reluctant to render the proposed Equal Rights Amendment (“ERA”) superfluous, compromised in Craig v. Boren. 50 This “intermediate scrutiny”
has been the standard for equal protection cases involving gender since
then, long after the ERA was defeated. The Court has not moved from this
position for almost forty years. Despite Justice Ginsburg’s efforts in United
States v. Virginia, 51 there is little or no indication that it will demand strict
scrutiny in gender-based equal protection.
Casey is perfectly symmetrical to Craig. The 1992 case does to abortion what Craig does to gender-based classifications. Both types of claims
are relegated to a status somewhere between an ordinary interest and a firsttier right or immunity. Compelling justification is no longer required for
restricting access to abortion, any more than it is for sex discrimination.

46. See BAER, supra note 35, at ch. 3, 6.
47. Heagney, supra note 43.
48. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); see Judith Baer, Advocate on the Court: Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and the Limits of Formal Equality, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE
COURT DYNAMIC 216–40 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003).
49. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
50. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
51. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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For all its brave talk about women’s freedom, the Casey plurality opinion
invites legislatures to limit legal abortion.
Could an argument for legal abortions be based on women’s rights
without declaring gender a suspect classification? A future Supreme Court
majority could begin with the recognition that this particular privacy claim
is unique in the sense that it belongs only to women. An opinion could go
on to argue that equality between the sexes entails the right to abortion. 52
This hope is not realistic at present, but this scenario is plausible in the long
run.
The most durable critiques of privacy doctrine came from radical feminists like Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin. Whereas Justice
Douglas referred in Griswold to “the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms,” 53 MacKinnon wrote, “The right of privacy is a right of men to be
let alone to oppress one woman at a time.” 54 She insisted, “Reproduction is
sexual, men control sexuality, and the state supports the rights of men as a
group. Roe does not contradict this.” 55
I have assigned Roe v. Wade and MacKinnon’s critique of it in my
courses since they became available. By now, most students are ho-hum
about Roe. Some women’s studies majors—oops, women’s and gender
studies—enrolled because of my association with the local Planned
Parenthood Clinic, but it was forced to close in 2013. Once in a while, a
woman student declares that abortion is against God’s law (no male student
has done this so far). If she says this in class, we can talk about freedom of
and from religion and the difference between opinion and policy, thus raising her grade and my evaluation scores. If she waits for the final, she’s
toast.
A former colleague reports that his students love MacKinnon’s work,
but he taught at the University of Hawaii. In south central Texas, the land
of personal responsibility and positive attitudes, only a rare few students
have that reaction. Some students laugh out loud. Some roll their eyes. An
occasional male student indignantly denies that he oppresses women or
even that he masturbates while reading Playboy. 56 These students need to
learn one general and one specific lesson. First, they need not agree with an
argument in order to understand it. Second, MacKinnon is not writing
about them, or about other people, any more than Karl Marx did. She is
writing about a situation: not class struggle, but male dominance.57 Those

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See Siegel & Siegel, supra note 33.
381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 93–102 (1987).
Id. at 97.
Id. at 209.
See BAER, supra note 35, at 40–67.
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who are quiet sometimes indicate receptivity to radical feminist ideas in
written assignments.
The majority Justices in Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, and Casey also
wrote about a situation. Although some of them might deny it, they held a
liberal view of the world. 58 “Marriage,” Justice Douglas wrote, “is a coming together for better or worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred,” an “association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.” 59 Justice William Brennan endorsed “the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.” 60 The difficulty here is that the
decision to bear or beget usually entails a partner. The protected autonomy
is both personal and associational. In Roe, the male partner disappears, replaced by a doctor (always “he”). As we have seen, the assumption of
equality between the parties is uncertain. The plurality opinion in Casey
returns to the Eisenstadt theme: “The destiny of the woman must be shaped
to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her
place in society.” 61
These judges knew, as lawyers must, that not all relationships fit this
model: one partner may dominate; unwanted sex may occur. Marriage may
be more nearly equal when people choose their own spouses than when
marriages are arranged, and when wife and husband are approximately the
same age rather than the Aristotelian ideal of a thirty-seven-year-old husband and an eighteen-year-old wife. 62 The relationship is presumed to involve equal partners exercising free will: consenting adults. Theories need
not account for all relevant facts.
MacKinnon rejects the premise of free will, the idea that sexual partners are equals, and the assumption that sex is consensual. She bases her
conclusions on her premises, just as the opinion authors did. She knows as
well as they do—she graduated from law school, too—that not all relationships fit her model. Neither the judges nor the radical feminists care
whether their premise holds for a majority or minority of instances. A partial test of any theory is what we can learn by suspending disbelief and proceeding as if it were correct.
The liberal assumptions can be and have been carried to extremes.
With respect to abusive relationships, for example, the question “Why
doesn’t she leave?” has often dominated reactions, leading to the conclusion
58. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
59. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
60. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis added).
61. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
62. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS bk. VII, at 293 (Betty Radice ed., The Penguin Classics,
1962) (c. 350 B.C.E.).
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that the abuse is consensual. It is not even a century since the domestic relations courts in Canada were praised for an “attitude of Rex pro the accused, and not Rex vs. the accused.” 63 The marital family is a unit, composed of equals. What the privacy doctrine accomplishes is to remove the
possibility of an official veto on personal decisions about sex and reproduction.
Yet the radicals are on to something:
Women who agree on little else share a perception of sex as
men’s assertion of power over them. An activist in Operation
Rescue says, ‘The idea [of abortion] is that a man can use a woman, vacuum her out, and she’s ready to be used again.’ A NOW
chapter advises feminists, ‘If your husband or lover is anti-choice
and thinks the government has a right to control women’s bodies,
then control his access to your body. ‘Just Say No’ to more sex
until all women are free to control their own lives and bodies. . . .
The fact that women can speak this way to one another, and be
understood, supports MacKinnon’s thesis. 64
(When I told this story at a conference, one woman commented, “Most
women who said no to sex would get the shit beaten out of them.”)
No, the right to privacy does not destroy male dominance. But what
MacKinnon has shown is the inadequacy of the privacy doctrine as a support for gender equality, not that privacy and equality are mutually exclusive. The one line the Supreme Court has consistently drawn is against
mandatory spousal consent or notification. 65 A prospective father who is
not married to his unborn child’s mother has no say at all. He cannot legally veto her abortion, though several have tried. A woman can get an abortion or birth control without getting permission. Privacy rights do not help
a woman who wants to have a baby or does not want to have reprosex. To
this extent, MacKinnon is right.
Two recurring themes in the abortion controversy provide a link to still
another privacy issue, that of family autonomy. In Roe v. Wade the Court
refused to choose between “a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy” and “the pregnant woman’s attending physician.” 66 And
consider the assumption of some anti-abortion activists that, other things
being equal, the woman would choose to have the baby—despite the number of pregnancies a woman can undergo during her fertile years. 67 The
63. AMANDA GLASBEEK, FEMINIZED JUSTICE: THE TORONTO WOMEN’S COURT, 1913–
1934, at 41 (2009).
64. See BAER, supra note 35, at 57.
65. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976); Casey, 505 U.S. at
887–98.
66. 410 U.S. 113, 153, 164 (1973).
67. See BAER, supra note 35, at 138.
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same hegemony of experts and commitment to life under any circumstances
pervade this discourse, too.
The claims recognized in Meyer and Pierce exist within the nuclear
family, which is both a private association and a public institution. Parents
have rights to make decisions for their children. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 68
which upheld the rights of Amish parents to withdraw their children from
school early, relied on the Free Exercise Clause, but the majority cited
Pierce several times. Only Justice Douglas questioned the assumption that
the interests of parents and children were identical.69
Parental autonomy has limits, but a gap exists between law and custom. Two well-publicized cases in the 1980s involved children with cancer
whose parents refused conventional treatment for them. 70 The parents of a
boy with Hodgkin’s Disease won. The parents of a boy with leukemia lost,
but defied the court order to take their son back for treatment. Both boys
died. 71 The chance that either would have survived with alternative treatments was remote, but their chances of dying with conventional treatment
were substantial. Outcomes like these may have influenced current law,
which does not permit parents to withhold lifesaving treatment for their
children. 72 But parents do. A web search produced headlines like, “Christian Kids Dying Because Their Parents Refuse Medical Treatment,”
“Amish Girl with Leukemia, Family Flees U.S. to Avoid Chemotherapy,”
and “Second Child of Philadelphia Faith-Healing Couple Dies.” 73 Parents
have more autonomy than law gives them. Privacy doctrine does not restructure family power any more than it ends male supremacy.
The extent of parental autonomy became clear in the recent controversy over MMR immunization. Personal anecdotes and bad science spread
the belief that this vaccine causes autism when given to infants and toddlers. So many parents have refused to get their children immunized that
herd immunity no longer exists for measles, which can disable or kill children too young for the vaccine. Most states allow some exemptions from
immunization requirements. Where the injections are required for admission to school, parents may homeschool, often with little supervision. Public health yields to private ignorance and illogic. Is this autonomy run riot?
In May 2015, the California legislature revisited the issue.
68. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
69. Id. at 243–46.
70. Respectively, Matter of Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2nd 1009 (N.Y. 1979); Custody of a Minor
Child, 393 N.E.2d 836 (Mass. 1979).
71. See JUDITH A. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 168–72 (1983).
EMEDICINEHEALTH,
72. Charles
Patrick
Davis,
Patient
Rights
www.emedicinehealth.com/patient_rights/article_em.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
73. Search for Parents Refusing Medical Treatment for Children, GOOGLE WEB SEARCH,
https://www.google.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2015).
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I am not arguing here that Griswold, Yoder, or any other decision
caused these developments. I suspect that the relationship between doctrine
and practice is as tenuous as that between obscenity law and the availability
of explicit material. But suppose we follow Justice Douglas in Yoder and
entertain the possibility that parents and children may disagree. What if a
minor who was old enough to have an informed opinion wanted to be immunized? Or what if a gravely ill child did not want treatment, or preferred
orthodox medical treatment to whatever alternatives the parents had chosen? In either case, a hospital, a health care professional, or another adult
might seek temporary guardianship, but how would the minor find such a
next friend? The child who wants to forgo treatment against parental wishes is out of luck. The child who wants treatment might seek legal emancipation or, where available, “mature minor” status, but then who would take
care of her during and after treatment? These situations are hypotheticals,
but a real case in 2015 had parent and child on the same side.
Cassandra C., a seventeen-year-old with Hodgkin’s lymphoma, rejected chemotherapy. “This is my life and my body,” she wrote. “I am a human—I should be able to decide if I do or don’t want chemotherapy. . . . I
care about the quality of my life, not just the quantity.” Her mother, Jackie
Fortin, supported her decision. 74 The Connecticut Department of Children
and Family Services (“DCF”) intervened. Cassandra became a ward of the
state, undergoing forced treatment. The state supreme court upheld DCF. 75
Adults have the right to refuse treatment. Cassandra gained this right when
she turned eighteen in September 2015. Parents are empowered to make
medical decisions for minor children, with partial exceptions for lifethreatening conditions, abortion, and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases. But, at least in Connecticut, the exception for life-threatening conditions is total. The medical establishment wins even when opposed by both
parent and child. Parental autonomy rules, except when it doesn’t. The
possibility of recovery trumps the risk of death.
Cassandra wrote, “My mom and I wanted to make sure my diagnosis
was correct, so we agreed to seek a second opinion. We wanted to be 100
percent sure I had cancer. Apparently, going for the second opinion and
questioning doctors was considered ‘wasting time’ and ‘not necessary.’” 76
The DCF took the experts’ point of view, accepting the medical reports at
face value. Its lawyer told the court that Cassandra and her mother indulged
in “some magical thinking that, ‘If I closed my eyes to the fact I have this

74. Cassandra C., Op-Ed: Cassandra’s Chemo Fight: ‘This Is My Life and My Body’,
HARTFORD COURANT (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.courant.com/opinion/op-ed/hc-op-cassandra-mybody-my-life-0109-20150108-story.html. Cassandra was released from custody on April 27.
75. Elizabeth A. Harris, Connecticut Teenager Loses Fight to Refuse Chemotherapy, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2015.
76. See supra note 74.
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serious illness, then my cancer doesn’t exist.’” 77 The question that preoccupied the court was whether Cassandra was mature enough to make the
decision, but legally she didn’t make it; her mother did. In conflicts between parents and children, parents win. In conflicts between professionals
and clients, professionals win.
Hodgkin’s lymphoma is curable—usually, but not always. Some people die of it. No one knows, immediately after diagnosis, who will recover
and who will not. The surgeon-author Atul Gawande describes how “the
logic and momentum of medical solutions take over” 78 the treatment of serious illness. Many clinicians pursue cures long after treatment has any effect but to make the patient worse. Many patients demand this commitment, but, as Cassandra’s case shows, not all. No one involved in her case
seems to have taken what Gawande calls an “interpretive” approach, helping her and her mother “determine what they want.” 79 Even a remote
chance of life is preferred to probable death.
III. WHITHER PRIVACY?
Even with these contradictions, equality and privacy are a potent combination. That is how the Supreme Court decriminalized homosexuality,
and how the highest courts of the U.S. and Massachusetts legalized samesex marriage. 80 The Casey plurality wrote that Roe v. Wade and Brown v.
Board of Education 81 “call[ed] the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in
the Constitution.” 82 Obergefell did the same, for the third time in the lives
of senior scholars. Such a ruling is unlikely to engender the national opposition that Roe did, but it may provoke the regional opposition that Brown
did. The right to abortion, however, hangs by a thread. While claiming to
preserve it, Casey allowed states to gut it. The right’s survival depends, as
it has since the Reagan administration, on which of the two major parties
prevails in the next election.
The space between the bedroom and the courtroom is filled with individuals, relationships, and the balance of power. Michel Foucault wrote
that sexuality was “an extremely dense transfer point for relations of power:
between men and women, young people and old people, parents and off77. Josh Kovner, Connecticut Supreme Court Upholds Ruling That State Can Force Chemotherapy on Teen, Hartford Courant (Jan. 8, 2015) http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hcteen-battles-chemo-order-0103-20150102-story.html.
78. ATUL GAWANDE, BEING MORTAL: MEDICINE AND WHAT MATTERS IN THE END 213
(2014).
79. Id. at 178, 161.
80. Respectively, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135
S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Goodridge et al. v. Commissioner of Public Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (2003).
81. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
82. 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992).

246

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 75:233

spring, teachers and students, priests and laity, an administration and a population.” 83 Law controls only the last pair, and that not completely. Government lacks the power to deliver freedom to a whole society.

83. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, 103 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978).

